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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY ANN TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY AND BOARD OF 
REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 13395 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
I. RECENT CASES SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
THAT SECTION 35-4-5(h), UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) 
IS VOID BECAUSE IT IS A VIOLATION OF AMENDMENT 
14 OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Two current cases have been cited by defen-
dants in their brief to bolster their denial 
that the Equal Protection Clause mandates a 
declaration that Section 35-4-5(h) of the Utah 
Code Ann, is void. The first of those cases, 
Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(19 74) adopts precisely the argument made by 
the plaintiff in this matter. The other case, 
Geduldig v. Aiello, U.S. , 41 L.Ed 
256, 95 S.Ct. 2485 (June 1974) does provide 
superficial support for defendants1 argument, 
but is clearly distinguishable from the case 
at issue. 
The State of Washington, like the State of 
Utah, has adopted a more enlightened view to-
ward the relationship of government to women 
than that traditionally found in the federal 
system. This view is well exemplified in the 
decision of the Washington Supreme Court in 
Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 
(19 74). Hanson involved a situation identical 
to the one before this Court. Unemployment 
compensation was denied the respondents in the 
case because they were pregnant. Section 50. 
20.030 of the RCW prohibited any unemployment 
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payments to be made to any pregnant woman for 
seventeen weeks prior to and six weeks subse-
quent to the date the baby was due. The Couri 
held that the statute violated the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the state constitute 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the federa 
constitution. 
The reasoning of the Supreme Court is 
cogent. The Court first concludes that 
the unemployment compensation provision is 
discriminatory on the basis of sex. "It is 
clear that only women must remain barren to 
be eligible for and to receive unemployment 
compensation." The Utah statute is equally 
discriminatory — it has the same provision. 
The Court then turns to the question of 
whether or not the provision is a violation 
of equal protection provisions in the state 
and federal constitutions. Relying upon the 
California Supreme Court decision in Sail'er 
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Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.3d 1, 18-20, 95 Cal. 
Rptr. 329, 340, 485 P.2d 529, 540 (1971) the 
Washington court held that discrimination on 
the basis of sex in inherently suspect, just 
as is discrimination on the basis of race. 
The California opinion is the most complete 
in its rationale. 
Sex, like race and lineage, is an 
immutable trait, a status into which 
the class members are locked by the 
accident of birth . „ .. The result 
is that the whole class is relegated 
to an inferior legal status without 
regard to the capabilities or char-
acteristics of its individual members 
Laws which disable women from full 
participation in the political, business 
and economic arenas are often charac-
terized as "protective" and beneficial. 
Those same laws applied to racial or 
ethnic minorities would readily be 
recognized as invidious and imper-
missible. The pedestal upon which 
women have been placed has all too 
often, upon closer inspection, been 
revealed as a cage. 
The defendants rely upon the United States 
Supreme Court opinion in Geduldig v. Aiello, 
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supra.? as support for their contention that 
the Utah statute is constitutional. In Aiello 
the United States Supreme Court upheld a 
medical disability insurance program that ex-
cluded pregnancy as a basis for coverage. The 
Court held that it was reasonable to provide 
disability insurance that covered some causes 
of disability but did not cover pregnancy. 
The facts in Aiello differ from those in 
this case in several ways. 
1. Aiello involved a medical disability 
insurance program which was offered as an 
alternative to private programs of equal 
or superior coverage. This case involves 
unemployment insurance that is mandatory, 
and run only by the state. 
2. The California program was funded 
completely by contributions by the em-
ployees . The Utah program is funded by 
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compulsory contributions made by employers. 
Those contributions must be in addition to 
the salaries ox employees. 
3. The California statute applies to all 
women who are otherwise eligible but who 
cannot work during pregnancy. The Utah 
statute, being an unemployment compensation 
statute, applies only to those women seekinc 
employment and able to accept it. 
These differences are all significant* The 
Court considered it relevant that the program 
operated completely independently of the state 
even though it was established by statute. Al-
though the Utah program is self-supporting the: 
is a strong state connection with its daily 
operation. The Court was also concerned be-
cause the program was funded completely by 
employee contributions. Because many low 
income employees were covered, the Court 
-6-
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recognized a legitimate interest in maximizing 
coverage for the subscribers without increasing 
payments. Finally, the purpose of the Califor-
nia statute was to provide disability insurance 
for some kinds of disabilities. The purpose 
of the Utah statute is to assist people, like 
Mrs. Turner, who are willing to work, and 
actively seeking work. 
The Supreme Court used the rational basis 
test in Aiello as defendants have claimed. 
However, Justice Stewart states clearly, in 
Footnote 20, that the Aiello opinion was limited 
to its facts and should not be considered a 
restriction upon Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 
L.Ed. 2d, 225, 92 S.Ct. 251 (1971) or Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 36 L.Ed.2d 503, 93 
S.Ct. 1764 (1973). The additional fact in Mrs. 
Turner's case that is not present in Aiello is 
the statutory requirement that the recipient be 
part of the available labor force. Defendants 
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agree that the California program is like the 
Utah plan because the Utah statute has other 
exclusions, such as the disabled, pensioners, 
those who quit or are terminated for cause• 
The theory is that pregnancy is related to emplc 
ability — that is, employers may be reluctant 
to hire pregnant women. The employer's attitude 
is not relevant under the Utah statute, nor 
should it be to the Court. The statutory con-
cern is whether claimant is willing and able to 
work. Mrs. Turner was both. 
Considering all the cases cited by plaintiff 
and defendants, the standard of review appropri-
ate for this Court is whether sex is a suspect 
classification under the Equal Protection doc-
trine. If so, Section 34-4-5 (h) is clearly void 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and under the Utah Consti-
tution, Article I, Section 2 and Article IV, 
-8-
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Section 1. Even under the rational basis test, 
the specific statutory provision must fail be-
cause it stands alone,- apart from every defined 
purpose and function cf the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff 
Mary Ann Turner urges this Court to declare 
Section 35-4-5(h) of the Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
to be void as a violation of the Utah Constitu-
tion and the 14th Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and to order the Department 
of Employment Security to pay Mrs. Turner those 
additional amounts of unemployment compensation 
to which she would otherwise have been entitled, 
together with costs of this action. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of 
January, 19 75. 
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